

# Covid-19 vaccine boosters for young adults: A risk-benefit assessment and five ethical arguments against mandates at universities

Kevin Bardosh, PhD<sup>1,2\*</sup>; Allison Krug, MPH<sup>3\*</sup>; Euzebiusz Jamrozik, MD, MA, PhD<sup>4</sup>;  
Trudo Lemmens, CandJur, LicJur, LLM, DCL<sup>5</sup>; Salmaan Keshavjee, MD, PhD, ScM<sup>6</sup>; Vinay  
Prasad, MD, MPH<sup>7</sup>; Martin Makary, MD, MPH<sup>8</sup>;  
Stefan Baral, MD, MPH, FRCPC<sup>9</sup>; Tracy Beth Høeg, MD, PhD<sup>10, 11</sup>

<sup>1</sup>School of Public Health, University of Washington, USA

<sup>2</sup>Division of Infection Medicine, Edinburgh Medical School, University of Edinburgh, UK

<sup>3</sup>Artemis Biomedical Communications LLC, Virginia Beach, VA, USA

<sup>4</sup>Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

<sup>5</sup>Faculty of Law and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Canada

<sup>6</sup>Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, USA

<sup>7</sup>University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA

<sup>8</sup>Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, USA

<sup>9</sup>Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA

<sup>10</sup>Florida Dept of Health, Tallahassee, FL, USA

<sup>11</sup>Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital, Grass Valley, CA, USA

\* Co-first authors

**Correspondence:** [kbardosh@uw.edu](mailto:kbardosh@uw.edu); [bardosh\\_kevin@hotmail.com](mailto:bardosh_kevin@hotmail.com)

## Abstract

Students at North American universities risk disenrollment due to third dose Covid-19 vaccine mandates. We present a risk-benefit assessment of boosters in this age group and provide five ethical arguments against mandates. We estimate that 22,000 - 30,000 previously uninfected adults aged 18-29 must be boosted with an mRNA vaccine to prevent one Covid-19 hospitalisation. Using CDC and sponsor-reported adverse event data, we find that booster mandates may cause a net expected harm: per Covid-19 hospitalisation prevented in previously uninfected young adults, we anticipate 18 to 98 serious adverse events, including 1.7 to 3.0 booster-associated myocarditis cases in males, and 1,373 to 3,234 cases of grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity which interferes with daily activities. Given the high prevalence of post-infection immunity, this risk-benefit profile is even less favourable. University booster mandates are unethical because: 1) no formal risk-benefit assessment exists for this age group; 2) vaccine mandates may result in a net expected harm to young people; 3) mandates are not proportionate: expected harms are not outweighed by public health benefits given the modest and transient effectiveness of vaccines against transmission; 4) US mandates violate the reciprocity principle because rare serious vaccine-related harms will not be reliably compensated due to gaps in current vaccine injury schemes; and 5) mandates create wider social harms. We consider counter-arguments such as a desire for socialisation and safety and show that such arguments lack scientific and/or ethical support. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for current 2-dose Covid-19 vaccine mandates in North America.

## 1. Introduction

Covid-19 vaccine booster mandates have been controversial, especially in younger age groups. Two main factors are driving scientific controversy: a lack of evidence that booster doses provide meaningful reduction in hospitalisation risk among young people and mounting evidence that (widespread) prior infection confers significant protection against hospitalisation due to (re-)infection. Further, mandates have deleterious societal consequences and are eroding trust in scientific and government institutions.<sup>1</sup> In North America, as of May 2022 at least 1,000 colleges and university campuses required Covid-19 vaccination, and over 300 required boosters.<sup>2</sup> More than fifty petitions have been written opposing these vaccine mandates<sup>3</sup>, raising specific legal and ethical complaints.<sup>4</sup> In many cases, young people, parents, and faculty have been ignored by administrators and mandate proponents.

Policymakers, public health scholars and bioethicists have argued both for and against Covid-19 vaccine mandates. The strongest argument made by mandate proponents is based on the harm principle: insofar as vaccines prevent transmission and thereby reduce harm to others, restrictions on individual freedom are viewed as more ethically justifiable.<sup>5</sup> Of course, a reduction in risk to others (especially if this is a small or temporary effect) might not alone be sufficient to justify a booster mandate in young people. Savulescu<sup>6</sup> and colleagues<sup>7</sup> have argued that, to be ethical, mandates require four conditions: that the disease be a grave public health threat; that there is a safe and effective vaccine; that mandatory vaccination has a superior cost/benefit profile in comparison to other alternatives; and that the level of coercion is proportionate.

Proportionality is a key principle in public health ethics.<sup>1</sup> To be proportionate, a policy must be expected to produce public health benefits that outweigh relevant harms, including harms

related to coercion, undue pressure, and other forms of liberty restriction. Williams<sup>8</sup> has argued that Covid-19 vaccine mandates may be justified for older but not younger people, among whom such policies are not proportionate given a lack of clarity that benefits outweighs harms. Such ethical assessments should rely on empirical data: thorough risk-benefit assessment requires quantification (where possible) of relevant risks and benefits *for the group affected by the policy*. With respect to poor outcomes due to Covid-19, the most consistent predictors are age<sup>9</sup> and comorbidities.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, age and sex are prominent risk factors for vaccine-associated reactogenicity<sup>11</sup> and serious adverse events such as myocarditis, which is more common in males.<sup>12</sup> Vaccine requirements must therefore be predicated on an age- and sex-stratified risk-benefit analysis and consider the protective effects of prior infection.

In this paper, we provide (to our knowledge) the first risk-benefit assessment of SARS-CoV-2 boosters for young previously *uninfected* adults under 40 years old. Our estimate suggests an expected net *harm* from boosters in this young adult age group, whereby the negative outcomes of all severe adverse events and hospitalizations may on average outweigh the expected benefits in terms of Covid-19 hospitalizations averted. We also examine the specific harms to males from myo/pericarditis. Our analysis is conservative given the fact that we did not account for the protective effects of prior infection, which is estimated to be substantive.<sup>13</sup> We then outline a five-part ethical argument against booster mandates for young people informed by our empirical assessment. First, we argue that there has been a lack of transparent risk-benefit assessment; second, that vaccine mandates may result in a net expected harm to individual young adults; third, that vaccine mandates are not proportionate; fourth, that US mandates violate the reciprocity principle because of current gaps in vaccine injury compensation schemes; fifth, that mandates are even less proportionate than the foregoing analyses suggest because current high levels of coercion or pressure create wider societal harms. We consider

possible counterarguments including potential rationales for mandates based on a desire for social cohesion or safety and summarise why such arguments cannot justify current Covid-19 vaccine mandates. We suggest that general mandates for young people ignore key data, entail wider social harms and/or abuses of power, and are arguably undermining rather than contributing to social trust and solidarity.

## **2. Background**

To provide background for our risk-benefit assessment and ethical arguments, we outline recent controversies among experts regarding vaccine boosters and summarise current data on Covid-19 vaccines, specifically: vaccine effectiveness against transmission, effectiveness in those with prior infection, and the age-stratified risk of severe COVID-19.

### **2.1. Controversy Among Experts**

The rapidly shifting policy response to the pandemic has exacerbated a crisis in the *trustworthiness* of scientific institutions, health agencies and regulatory bodies. Transparency in policy making has been threatened in part by political expediency, sometimes even to the point of government agencies over-ruling appointed scientific expert groups without clear explanation of the reasons for such reversals. For example, in July 2021, the CDC released a joint statement with the FDA<sup>14</sup> reassuring the public that boosters were not necessary. Just two months later, in September 2021, a US FDA advisory committee overwhelmingly voted 16-2 against boosting healthy young adults.<sup>15</sup> Yet, this recommendation was overruled by the White House and CDC leading to the resignation of two high-level FDA vaccine experts. These experts wrote in *The Lancet* about the “...need to identify specific circumstances in which the direct and indirect benefits of doing so are, on balance, clearly beneficial.”<sup>16</sup> To date, no such favourable risk-benefit assessment has been made public.<sup>17</sup>

Because the mRNA vaccine 3<sup>rd</sup> dose booster trials were too small to measure important clinical endpoints, additional doses have been granted Emergency Use Authorisation (EUA) based on observational data suggesting benefits in older populations.<sup>18</sup> Prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant, the US CDC estimated<sup>18</sup> that administering a booster dose to 9,000 (Pfizer) or 12,000 (Moderna) 18–29-year-olds would prevent one Covid-19 hospitalisation over six months. As of August 2022, this estimate has not been updated to reflect increasing natural immunity or waning vaccine effectiveness. Data on vaccine effectiveness specific to young adults is scarce, but reports from the UK<sup>19</sup> and Israel<sup>20</sup> failed to identify additional protective effects of boosters against severe disease for people younger than 40. In a recent CDC publication, which stratified for ages 18-49, a booster dose increased effectiveness against emergency department encounters and hospitalizations among immunocompetent adults during the Omicron wave, but the analysis did not adjust for comorbidities and excluded those with a history of prior infection “to reduce the influence of protection from previous infection.”<sup>21</sup>

Risk-benefit calculations for the primary series among younger children and adolescents are similarly scant. A cohort study conducted in Hong Kong estimated the number needed to harm (NNH) from myo/pericarditis for dose two of BNT162b2 was 2563 among adolescent males<sup>22</sup> yet the CDC never published a U.S.-specific NNH, nor recommended shifting to a one-dose policy for adolescents as did the UK, Norway, Taiwan and Hong Kong.<sup>22</sup> The most recent Covid-19 number needed to vaccinate (NNV) calculation conducted by the CDC in June 2022 estimated that 1660 to 3320 children ages 6 months to 4 years would need to be vaccinated to prevent one hospitalisation; no NNH was offered for comparison.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the CDC’s outdated risk-benefit analysis for adolescents and young adults does not distinguish important subgroups such as or those who have recovered from previous infection or healthy young

people (as opposed to those with comorbidities or immunocompromised status). Finally, many countries have not required or mandated booster doses for young healthy adults at universities<sup>24</sup>, suggesting that, at a minimum, there is a diversity of expert views on whether the expected benefits of such policies outweigh their potential harms.

## 2.2. Current Data Regarding Covid-19 vaccines

A thorough *ethical* evaluation of risks and benefits requires relevant *empirical* data, especially where risks and benefits can be quantified to a reasonable degree of certainty. Relevant data include not only those regarding average individual vaccine safety and effectiveness but also age-stratification of these data as well as the protective effect of prior infection and the effectiveness of vaccines against transmission.

Proponents of mandates have argued that current vaccines “prevent transmission,” which would support a standard ethical reason in favour of mandates: the protection of others. Yet it is increasingly clear that current vaccines provide, at most, partial and transient protection against infection, which decreases precipitously after a few months<sup>25,26</sup>, with secondary transmission largely unaffected (in other words: an infected vaccinated person poses similar risks to others as an infected unvaccinated person).<sup>27,28</sup> The CDC states: “anyone with Omicron infection, regardless of vaccination status or whether or not they have symptoms, can spread the virus to others.”<sup>29</sup> It is therefore inaccurate to infer a sustained or long-term reduction in transmission from a short-term reduction in infection.<sup>30</sup>

A second limitation is ignoring the protective effects of prior infection. In February 2022, the CDC estimated that 67% of adults 18-49 had infection-induced SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, up from 30% in September 2021.<sup>13</sup> By now (August 2022), the majority of young adults, both

vaccinated and unvaccinated, have most likely already been infected with Covid-19. Evidence increasingly shows that prior SARS-CoV-2 infection provides at least similar clinical protection to current vaccines<sup>31-33</sup>, something that is not acknowledged in current university policies. It is not clear whether vaccination of previously infected individuals provides any meaningful benefits with respect to severe disease, especially for healthy young people.<sup>34</sup>

Mass vaccination had been proposed as a way to “end the pandemic.”<sup>35</sup> However, elimination or eradication of the virus is not a tenable goal with vaccines that provide only temporary and incomplete reduction in infection risk, and the presence of multiple animal reservoirs. Because of this, nearly all human beings will eventually be infected with SARS-CoV-2, as with other endemic coronaviruses (and every pandemic influenza virus on record), many times in their lifetime.<sup>36</sup> Denmark has, for example, acknowledged vaccinating children was not effective at curbing spread of the virus and is thus no longer recommending vaccination against Covid-19 for most children.<sup>37,38</sup>

A final point relates to the burden of Covid-19 in young adults under 40. Using pre-vaccine era mortality data from 190 countries, an adjusted infection fatality ratio (IFR) for 18 to 29 year-olds ranges from 100 per million (18 year-olds) to 500 per million (29 year-olds) with significant variation by country within each age stratum.<sup>39</sup> During the Omicron surge, and stratified by vaccination status, the CDC’s maximum reported crude mortality incidence rate (IR) for 18-29 year-olds was 1 per million among the vaccinated and 5 per million among the unvaccinated.<sup>40</sup> Taking population immunity into account with variant severity and projected coincident surges of influenza, SARS-CoV-2, and respiratory syncytial virus in the winter of 2022-2023, the UK’s Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) currently recommends for its fall booster campaign that the following groups at high risk for severe

outcomes be *offered* a booster: residents and staff in care homes for older adults; frontline healthcare and social care workers; adults over 50 years; people aged 5 to 49 years in a clinical risk group or living with someone who has immunosuppression; and persons age 16 to 49 who are care givers.<sup>41</sup> Both vaccination and prior infection can substantially reduce the likelihood of mortality<sup>32,33,41</sup> but the protection against hospitalisation afforded by a booster wanes at 15 weeks to an estimated 80% during BA.1 and 56.5% during for BA.2.<sup>42</sup> Using a national population-wide dataset in Qatar, both previous infection alone and vaccination alone were found to provide >70% protection against severe, critical or fatal Omicron (BA.1 or BA.2).<sup>43</sup> Prior infection alone was 91% effective whereas protection from two or three doses of vaccine alone was 66% and 83%, respectively. Covid-19 does cause acute illness, and may have long-term effects for some, particularly those who develop critical illness, but vaccination appears to confer at best modest protection against longer-term sequelae<sup>44</sup> and the existing data are non-randomized, from variants that predate Omicron and with unclear relevance for current adults under age 40. The existence of effective treatments for clinical management<sup>45</sup> is also an argument against vaccine mandates, especially for groups not considered at risk for severe illness.

### 3. Risk-Benefit Assessment

In a recent editorial, vaccine developer and paediatrician Paul Offit<sup>34</sup> argued that “because boosters are not risk-free, we need to clarify which groups most benefit....It is now incumbent on the CDC to determine who most benefits from booster dosing and to educate the public about the limits of mucosal vaccines.”<sup>1</sup> Below, we provide an Omicron-specific risk-benefit assessment of booster vaccination for young adults ages 18 to 29 years for both Pfizer

---

<sup>1</sup> Offit recommended that his own son not receive a booster dose due to concerns that benefits would not outweigh risks [<https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2022/01/should-teens-get-booster-omicron/621222/>].



(BNT162b2) and Moderna (mRNA-1273) vaccines. This analysis builds on the first stratified risk-benefit analysis of vaccination among adolescents 12-17 years of age which considered age, sex, health status, virulence of the dominant variant, and population prevalence of post-infection immunity.<sup>46</sup> For the booster among young adults ages 18-29, the calculations leverage the CDC's pre-Omicron number needed to vaccinate, the estimated reduction in severity of Omicron vs Delta<sup>47</sup>, and current estimated seroprevalence.<sup>13</sup> While harms from Covid-19 vaccines are rare<sup>48</sup> they should be factored into policy recommendations. This risk-benefit analysis considers the overall rate of reported SAEs and grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity (Figure 1) and myo/pericarditis among males (Figure 2). Rates and definitions are consolidated in Table 1.

Serious adverse events are defined by the FDA and the National Institutes of Health<sup>49</sup> as an adverse event that results in any of the following conditions: death; life-threatening at the time of the event; inpatient hospitalisation or prolongation of existing hospitalisation; persistent or significant disability/incapacity; a congenital anomaly/birth defect; or a medically important event, based on medical judgement. Grade 3 or 4 reactogenicity is defined as local/systemic events that prevent daily routine activity or require use of a pain reliever (grade 3) or requiring an emergency room visit or hospitalisation (grade 4).<sup>49,50</sup>

To estimate the expected harms (SAEs including myocarditis and grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity) and benefits (Covid hospitalizations prevented) specific to boosting 18–29-year-old young adults, we used data reported by CDC from phase 2/3 clinical trials<sup>18,50-52</sup>, peer-reviewed observational data from large integrated health systems<sup>53-57</sup>, post-marketing surveillance collected via V-Safe by the CDC<sup>58</sup>, and an international estimate in a young adult population.<sup>54</sup>

### 3.1. Serious adverse event (SAE) rates reported from manufacturer-provided data

Of the 12 SAEs reported by Pfizer in the booster trial (n=5055), three were found by blinded investigators to be attributable to the vaccine, providing a rate of 1 in 1685 (3/5055)<sup>18</sup> as the lower bound while the upper bound is drawn from the CDC's Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) review which reported a rate of 1 in 306.<sup>50</sup> For a campus of 30,000 boosted with the Pfizer product, the expected SAE rate is therefore 18 (3/5055\*30,000) to 98 (1/306\*30,000). Surprisingly, Moderna found that none of the 5 SAEs experienced by 4 out of 344 participants<sup>50</sup> in its open-label booster trial (4/344=1.2%)<sup>2</sup> were attributable to the vaccine, thus our SAE estimates are for Pfizer only.

### 3.2. Reactogenicity rates

According to self-report data, side effects from the booster dose prevent up to a third of recipients from being able to carry out normal daily activities in the days following vaccination.<sup>55</sup> Sponsor-reported rates for grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity are 1 in 22 (14/306)<sup>50</sup> for the Pfizer booster to 1 in 9 (18/167)<sup>50</sup> for the Moderna booster. For a campus of 30,000 boosted previously uninfected young adults, the expected number of grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity cases is therefore 1373 (14/306\*30,000) to 3234 (18/167\*30,000), respectively. In those with a prior SARS-CoV-2 infection, post-vaccination symptoms causing missed work or daily activities are reported two- to three-fold more often than those without a history of infection<sup>56,57</sup>, a major concern given that seroprevalence among adults aged 18-49 is now well above the February 2022 estimate of 67%.<sup>13</sup> Conservatively assuming 67% as the proportion with a history of

<sup>2</sup> [Table 3e footnote h](#): Overall, 4/344 (1.2%) participants experienced 5 SAEs during a median follow-up of 5.7 months after booster dose (administered at least 6 months after a 50 mcg (n=173) or 100 mcg (n=171) 2-dose primary series); the sponsor deemed these unrelated to mRNA-1273. Data on an equivalent primary series comparison group was not available at the time of the GRADE assessment.

Covid-19 infection, and a two- to threefold increased likelihood of systemic effects, expected grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity cases would be at least 1839 to 4333 for Pfizer and Moderna boosters, respectively. Even without taking into account prior infection, the proportion reporting to V-Safe being “unable to perform daily activities” was between 20-40% depending on booster product, and higher among those receiving a heterologous booster.<sup>58</sup>

### 3.3. Booster vaccine-associated myocarditis rates in university-age males 18-29 years

The CDC estimated the rate of post-booster myocarditis during days 0 to 7 following BNT162b2 vaccine administration in 16–17 year-old males to be 1 in 41,500<sup>51</sup> using passive surveillance through the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), and 1 in 5000<sup>51</sup> using active surveillance with the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD). In 18–29 year-old males, the post-booster myocarditis rate for both products combined using VAERS was reported to be 1 in 101,000<sup>52</sup> (ages 18–24) to 1 in 208,000<sup>52</sup> (ages 25–29) while the VSD rate was much higher at 1 in 14,200<sup>52</sup> (mRNA-1273) to 1 in 21,000<sup>52</sup> (BNT162b2). Two other population-based studies from the US and Israel in 18–24-year-old males found the rate to be 1 in 7000<sup>53</sup> to 9000.<sup>54</sup> In both of these studies, BNT162b2 was the vaccine administered prior to diagnosis. For our estimates, and assuming a precautionary stance, we have used active surveillance rates or population-based rates. For 16–17 year old males we use the VSD rate of 1 in 5000<sup>51</sup>; for 18–29 year olds we consider the rate 1 in 7000<sup>53</sup> to be the most reliable because the same method was used to estimate the dose-two myocarditis rate for adolescents ages 12–17<sup>59</sup>, based on CDC definitions and databases, and was consistent with international estimates for this age group.<sup>46</sup> We provide a 16–17 year-old rate given that academic acceleration allows younger adults to attend college along with the freshman cohort. In our figures, we provide a range of myopericarditis estimates for consideration.

### 3.4. Hospitalizations prevented

To estimate the benefits of hospitalizations prevented by boosters, we updated the CDC's estimated number needed to vaccinate (NNV)<sup>18</sup> for a strain such as Omicron which was found to be approximately 59% less virulent<sup>47</sup> than Delta. Scaling the CDC's NNV estimates of 9,000 for BNT162b2 and 12,000 for mRNA-1273 by this reduced severity, we estimate that 22,000 (9000/0.41) to 30,000 (12,000/0.41) young adults would need to be boosted with BNT162b2 or mRNA-1273, respectively, to prevent one Covid-19 hospitalisation over six months.

### 3.5. Risk-benefit estimates

At this scale, and as shown in Figure 1, a hypothetical campus with 30,000 young adults receiving the BNT162b2 booster could expect *more* SAEs (18 to 98) than Covid-19 hospitalizations averted (1.0-1.4). Our hypothetical campus may also expect 1373 to 3234 young adults (rate of 1 in 9-22<sup>50</sup>) to experience Grade  $\geq 3$  reactogenicity disrupting daily activities or requiring medical care when vaccinated with BNT162b2 or mRNA-1273, respectively. Given that prior SARS-CoV-2 infection increases the rate of systemic reactions by two- to three-fold<sup>56,57</sup>, the number of young adults expected to experience disruptions in their school and daily activities is likely to exceed 1839 with BNT162b2 and 4333 with mRNA-1273.

If the 15,000 males and 15,000 females ages 18-29 years on the hypothetical campus were all boosted under a universal mandate, we estimate between 1.7 to 3.0 occurrences of myocarditis (rates of 1 in 7,000<sup>53</sup> to 1 in 5000<sup>51</sup>) among males and 0.7 cases among females.<sup>51</sup> Boosting the

entire campus could thus cause approximately 3-4 myo/pericarditis cases, among males predominantly, per single hospitalisation averted. (Figure 2)

Most media reports, as well as a recent systematic review<sup>60</sup> and expert opinion from the American College of Cardiology<sup>61</sup> present vaccination-associated myo/pericarditis as rare, (typically) “mild” and followed by rapid recovery with anti-inflammatory treatment. The reviews have not framed vaccine-associated risks versus infection-associated risks using compatible denominators based on exposure (vaccination) and infection (seroprevalence), thus the infection-associated risks may have been overstated by at least a factor of four according to CDC estimates of the burden of Covid-19 illness.<sup>62</sup> However, it has been found to occur in as many as 1 in 2652 males aged 12–17 years old and 1 in 1862 males aged 18–24 years old after the second dose<sup>59</sup> (and as high as 1/1300 after the second dose in a Pfizer-Moderna combination).<sup>63</sup> An Israeli study described 1 in 5 cases among 16–29 year-olds to be of intermediate severity, meaning these cases had persistent new/worsening abnormalities in left ventricular (LV) function, or persistent ECG anomalies, or frequent non-sustained ventricular arrhythmias without syncope.<sup>64</sup> The CDC reported that 1200 of the 1314 verified myocarditis cases with known hospitalisation status following primary series or booster had been hospitalized.<sup>65</sup> Among adolescents, 69%<sup>66</sup>-80%<sup>67</sup> of those diagnosed with vaccine associated myopericarditis had findings consistent with cardiac scarring on MRI testing three to eight months after the second dose. The potential long-term impact of scar tissue on heart conduction remains unknown.<sup>66,67</sup> Post-vaccination myocarditis has been found to be equivalent to or exceed the risk of post-Covid myocarditis in males less than 40 years old despite the lack of seroprevalence-based estimates of Covid-associated myocarditis.<sup>68</sup> Rare incidences of death in young males attributed to mRNA vaccine induced myocarditis have also been reported.<sup>69,70</sup>

340 **Table 1. Risk-benefit analysis inputs: definitions and rates for serious adverse events (SAEs), reactogenicity, and myo/pericarditis**


341

Rate	Definition	Numerator/Denominator		Risk
Serious Adverse Events (SAEs)	An adverse event that results in any of the following conditions: death; life-threatening at the time of the event; inpatient hospitalisation or prolongation of existing hospitalisation; persistent or significant disability/incapacity; a congenital anomaly/birth defect; or a medically important event, based on medical judgement.	Pfizer: <a href="#">3 / 5055</a> <sup>18</sup> Slide 26  Pfizer: <a href="#">1 / 306</a> <sup>50</sup> Table 4a  Moderna: <a href="#">0 / 171</a> <sup>*50</sup> Table 4b		1 in 1685   1 in 306
Reactogenicity	Grade 3 or 4 reactogenicity is defined as local/systemic events that prevent daily routine activity or require use of a pain reliever (grade 3) or requiring an emergency room visit or hospitalisation (grade 4).	Pfizer: <a href="#">14 / 306</a> <sup>50</sup> Table 3f  Pfizer: <a href="#">19 / 289</a> <sup>50</sup> Table 4a  Moderna: <a href="#">18 / 167</a> <sup>50</sup> Table 3f, 4b		1 in 22  1 in 15  1 in 9
Myo/pericarditis	<p><a href="#">CDC case definitions</a><sup>17</sup></p> <p><b>Myocarditis</b></p> <p><u>Probable</u></p> <p>1. Presence of ≥1 new or worsening of the following clinical symptoms:*</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Chest pain/pressure/discomfort</li> <li>-Dyspnea/shortness of breath</li> <li>-Palpitations</li> </ul> <p>2. Abnormal testing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Elevated troponin</li> <li>-ECG or EKG findings</li> </ul> <p><u>Confirmed</u></p> <p>1. Symptoms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Chest pain/pressure/discomfort</li> <li>-Dyspnea/shortness of breath</li> <li>-Palpitations</li> </ul> <p>2. Abnormal testing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Biopsy</li> </ul>	<p><b>Males Booster</b></p> <p><b>Ages 18-29</b></p> <p><a href="#">147/mill</a><sup>53</sup> Sharff et al <a href="#">112.5/mill</a><sup>54</sup> Friedensohn et al (IDF)</p> <p>Pfizer (VAERS): 18-24 <a href="#">9.9/mill</a><sup>52</sup> 25-29 <a href="#">4.8/mill</a><sup>52</sup></p>	<p><b>Females Booster</b></p> <p><b>Ages 18-29</b></p> <p>n/a  n/a</p> <p>Pfizer (VAERS): 18-24 <a href="#">0.6/mill</a><sup>52</sup> 25-29 <a href="#">2.0/mill</a><sup>52</sup></p>	<p>Male: 1 in 6800</p> <p>Male: 1 in 8900</p> <p>Male: 1 in 101k Female: 1 in 1.7 mill Male: 1 in 208k</p>

Rate	Definition		Numerator/Denominator		Risk
	<p>-Decreased function on ECHO or MRI</p> <p>-cMRI findings consistent with myocarditis</p> <p>3. No other identified cause</p> <p><b>Pericarditis</b></p> <p>Presence of <math>\geq 2</math> new or worsening of the following clinical features:</p> <p>-acute chest pain</p> <p>-pericardial rub on exam</p> <p>-new ST-elevation or PR-depression on EKG</p> <p>-new or worsening pericardial effusion on ECHO or cMRI</p>	<p>-Elevated troponin AND MRI findings consistent with myocarditis</p> <p>3. No other identified cause</p>	<p>slide 11</p> <p>Pfizer (VSD): <a href="#">47.6/mill</a><sup>52</sup> slide 23</p> <p>Moderna (VSD): <a href="#">70.3/mill</a><sup>52</sup> slide 23</p> <p><b>Ages 16-17</b></p> <p>Pfizer (VAERS): <a href="#">24.1/mill</a><sup>51</sup> slide 10</p> <p>Pfizer (VSD): <a href="#">200.3/mill</a><sup>51</sup> slide 25</p>	<p>slide 11</p> <p>Pfizer (VSD): <a href="#">4.7/mill</a><sup>52</sup> slide 23</p> <p>Moderna (VSD): <a href="#">13.9/mill</a><sup>52</sup> slide 23</p> <p><b>Ages 16-17</b></p> <p>Pfizer (VAERS): <a href="#">0.0/mill</a><sup>51</sup> slide 10</p> <p>Pfizer (VSD): <a href="#">44.0/mill</a><sup>51</sup> slide 25</p>	<p>Female: 1 in 500k</p> <p>Male: 1 in 21k Female: 1 in 213k</p> <p>Male: 1 in 14k Female: 1 in 72k</p> <p>Male: 1 in 41.5k Female: 0</p> <p>Male: 1 in 5000 Female: 1 in 23k</p>


\*Footnote from GRADE: Overall, 4/344 (1.2%) participants experienced 5 SAEs during a median follow-up of 5.7 months after booster dose (administered at least 6 months after a 50 mcg (n=173) or 100 mcg (n=171) 2-dose primary series); the sponsor deemed these unrelated to mRNA-1273. Data on an equivalent primary series comparison group was not available at the time of the GRADE assessment.

**Fig 1: Expected Serious Adverse Events (SAEs) and Grade  $\geq 3$  Reactogenicity Per Single Hospitalisation Prevented with Universal Booster Vaccination on a Large University Campus of 30,000 Students**





**Fig 2: Expected Myopericarditis Cases per Single Hospitalisation Prevented with Universal Booster Vaccination on a Large University Campus with 30,000 Students (15,000 Males)**



### 3.6. Limitations of analysis

These estimates have a number of limitations. First, our estimates rely on sponsor-reported and CDC summaries of adverse events; we cannot account for failures to report or loss to follow-up during the clinical trials. Second, we do not distinguish between specific types or clinical significance of SAEs because of scarce data, including the small sample size of the original booster clinical trials and the inability to verify reasons for participant loss to follow-up, which may have been due to unreported SAEs. The Pfizer trial, for example, included only 78 individuals 16–17 years of age randomised to receive booster or placebo.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless one

male in this age group was diagnosed with myocarditis. It is also possible that multiple severe side-effects were reported by the same participant and that the number of people impacted by such reactions is lower than our estimate. We are extrapolating SAE data to young adults (18–29 years old) that were originally generated in clinical trials involving all age groups. However, studies have shown that younger people have a greater likelihood of vaccine-related adverse events.<sup>72</sup> The three vaccine-associated SAEs reported by Pfizer were moderate persistent tachycardia, moderate transient elevated hepatic enzymes, and mild elevated hepatic enzymes.<sup>18</sup> Hence, the causal relationship between our estimated SAEs and the Covid-19 vaccines needs to be approached with caution. Haas et al.<sup>73</sup> suggested that many systemic AEs in the RCTs (76% of systemic and 24% of local reactogenicity) may have been due to a nocebo effect—anxiety, expectations and background symptoms. It is very likely, however, that real-world severe or serious AEs may be greater than those reported in the RCT data because standard trials are underpowered to detect rare AEs and there may also be selection bias: those with greater expectation of harmful side effects are less likely to enrol in a trial. In fact, these data are usually collected after a drug has been approved and is on the market (phase IV clinical trial data). Such limitations show the need for more robust post-marketing data and ideally large, controlled trials to determine costs and benefits for any future booster doses, especially in younger age groups. Universities have not recorded cumulative adverse event rates on their Covid-19 dashboards, thus there is no way to validate our estimates with real-world data. Even with the residual uncertainties, our risk-benefit assessment shows that it is at least plausible that expected individual harms outweigh benefits for young healthy people (i.e., most young adults), and it is implausible that individual benefits significantly outweigh risks. Pfizer’s public data supports this inference.<sup>72</sup> In requesting the EUA for boosting adolescent males, the Pfizer’s risk-benefit analysis estimated 23-69 cases of myocarditis per one million booster doses administered and 29-69 hospitalizations averted, yet this estimate of 23-69 cases of

myocarditis per million third doses administered is now known to be an order of magnitude below the 200.3 per million reported by the US CDC among adolescents aged 16–17 years.<sup>51</sup>

#### **4. Five ethical arguments against university booster mandates**

Below, we present five ethical arguments against university booster mandates informed by our risk-benefit assessment and ethical analysis of mandatory policies to date. These arguments relate to (1) the importance of transparency in policy (which has been lacking), (2) the potential for net individual harm, (3) the lack of a proportionate public health benefit, (4) the lack of reciprocity in terms of compensation for vaccine-related harms, and (5) the wider social harms of vaccine mandates.

##### **4.1. Transparency**

Risk-benefit assessment is essential to the ethical acceptability of public health policy, and transparent assessments help maintain trust in public health, especially in the context of controversial policies. There is an even stronger rationale for thorough and transparent risk-benefit assessment when interventions are mandated or when (given uncertainty or relevant population differences) some people might face harms not outweighed by individual benefits. In such cases, risk-benefit assessments should be stratified by demographic factors and updated as new data become available to reduce uncertainty. At a minimum, if an intervention is implemented despite significant uncertainty (especially if it is mandated), there is a strong ethical rationale to collect (controlled) data to resolve relevant uncertainties.

It is arguably negligent that key institutions such as the CDC and FDA have not conducted a risk-benefit assessment either before or after recommending that all adults *should* receive a

booster dose. Without such a formal analysis, professional associations (such as the American College of Cardiology (ACC) expert panel<sup>61</sup>) have been forced to infer from the literature and CDC's own analyses. For example, the ACC expert panel produced a graphic displaying a favourable harms vs. benefits ratio for young adults ages 12-29.<sup>61</sup> The ACC's widely promoted graphic is tied to data presented by the CDC<sup>74</sup> and relies on four key assumptions which necessarily bias the findings in favour of vaccination: 1) vaccine effectiveness of 95% over 120 days to prevent Covid-19 cases and hospitalizations; 2) myocarditis rates were derived from passive surveillance in VAERS instead of active surveillance available to the CDC (VSD) resulting in harms being underestimated by a factor of 10<sup>51,52</sup>; 3) harms and benefits were averaged across ages 12-29 when the risk may be highest among those aged 16-19<sup>51,52</sup>; and 4) hospitalisation rates were tied to May 2021 data, more than a year prior to the ACC's review and pre-Omicron. Nevertheless, for adolescent males ages 12-17, the CDC estimated 56-69 myocarditis cases would be expected while 71 ICU admissions could be averted.<sup>74</sup>

It was foreseeable that the decision to approve boosters (against the advice of the FDA panel) would be followed by booster mandates since pandemic vaccine mandates were already in place in many universities and colleges throughout the United States at the time.<sup>13</sup> Universities rely upon public health agencies such as the CDC for guidance. Thus, we maintain that if mandates remain then there is an ethical obligation for the agency (and independent scientists) to update public NNV estimates for boosters among adults younger than 40, stratified by sex, comorbidity status and history of infection to provide evidence that the intervention confers an expected net benefit to individuals younger than 40 years in the context of the prevailing SARS-CoV-2 variants and pre-existing immunity. Without this, it is problematic to simply claim that Covid-19 vaccines are "safe and effective" without specific risk-benefit analyses for different age categories and with consideration for individual health status, including evidence of prior

infection, because risks of both disease and vaccination are highly variable according to these factors.<sup>9,10</sup>

Since there has not been any RCT specific to evaluating boosters in young adults, the CDC relied on data from an older cohort with a median age of 51.<sup>71,75</sup> and perhaps assumed that the benefits would also outweigh risks for younger age groups. As we have shown, it is likely that this assumption is incorrect. Under such uncertainties, ethical vaccine policymaking arguably requires radical transparency about scientific knowledge and uncertainties regarding vaccine risks and benefits (i.e., even more transparency than where certainty is high).

Transparent policymaking can encounter a “trust paradox” in providing information about vaccine risks to the public. As noted by Petersen, et al.<sup>76</sup> governments have a perverse incentive to withhold negative information about vaccines since they are actively promoting such products and negative information about vaccines reduces vaccination uptake. And yet transparent disclosure about negative information (e.g., side effects) helps to sustain trust in health officials and reduces the politicisation of vaccines.<sup>77</sup> Transparency may reduce the uptake of vaccination in the short-term but will uphold trust in health authorities and vaccines in the longer-term—just as open disclosure regarding clinical harms promotes trust in medicine.<sup>78</sup> Conversely, efforts by the FDA to prevent the release of internal documents and communications with Pfizer when requested by a civil society group (<https://phmpt.org>) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reinforce the view that regulatory agencies are not being transparent with the public. To address the “trust paradox” in regulatory politics, and to maintain trust in government and scientific institutions, greater data accountability (in this case, a risk-benefit analysis) should precede mandates. Given concerns about pharmaceutical

influence on the political process<sup>78,79</sup> this should be facilitated by new mechanisms for independent scrutiny of regulatory science during emergencies.<sup>79</sup>

#### 4.2. Potential Net Expected Individual Harm

The reasonable possibility of a net harm to individuals (as presented in our risk-benefit assessment) should provide a strong basis to argue for the ethical case against booster mandates for young adults. Mandates at institutions of higher education serve the age group with one of the lowest public health burdens from Covid-19. Hence boosters provide a low impact on hospitalisation and a low impact on transmission for an age group with a low prospect of benefit. Arguably, this has been considered by most universities and colleges and is the reason why most do *not* have booster mandates for the fall of 2022. In fact, this is likely why European countries, including the UK, France, Germany and Norway, Sweden and Denmark (to our knowledge) never had university-implemented mandates.<sup>24</sup> When the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) recommended boosters for all adults in November 2021, priority was focused on those over age 40.<sup>80</sup> Taking a different view of the data, the US CDC recommended boosters for all adults and currently recommends a *second* booster for all Americans aged 50 years or more.<sup>81</sup> The ECDC, in contrast, recommended that first boosters be “offered” with prioritisation for those over 40 years, and second boosters only for those over age 60 and those with an immunocompromised status or high risk medical conditions.<sup>82</sup>

The UK’s *Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation* (JCVI) provides an interesting example of using the potential for net harm to advise *against* the primary vaccination series for 12–15-year-olds.<sup>83</sup> The JCVI argued that the potential benefit of vaccination in this age group was only “marginally greater than the potential known harms,” since healthy 12–15-year-olds are at very low risk of serious outcomes from Covid-19. Although it may (or may not) be the

case that the JCVI adopted worst-case estimates<sup>84</sup>, such an approach reinforces the need to act judiciously under conditions of uncertainty where the clear benefits of an intervention are not confidently above the potential harms. Note also that they mention “potential known harms” without taking into consideration potential long-term effects. The UK Health Ministers subsequently voted to offer a single dose of vaccination to adolescents ages 12-15 in consideration of: “...the health and wider social benefits to this cohort.”<sup>85</sup> A second dose was offered to those with underlying health conditions. There are important parallels between the JCVI decision and the outcome of the FDA panel that recommended against universal booster recommendations for adults in the US in the fall of 2021: in both cases, the US and UK governments went against these recommendations. A key ethical difference is that the UK has not implemented any Covid-19 vaccine mandates at schools or universities, and the mandate proposed for care home and healthcare workers was withdrawn.<sup>86</sup>

As noted above, blanket mandates ignore critical data, such as the benefits of prior infection and data on adverse effects. These factors make an expected net harm now even more likely than when mandates began and make it even more urgent to update Covid-19 vaccine policy. Policies for other vaccines have been updated following the accumulation of new data. For example, adult boosters for tetanus and diphtheria vaccines (though previously widely administered) have been shown to provide no benefit.<sup>87</sup> Vaccines for influenza, dengue, and rotavirus have been withdrawn or had strict limitations placed on their use in children due to unexpected harms.<sup>88</sup> Adenovirus-vectored Covid-19 vaccines have been limited in their use due to thrombosis (especially in younger women).<sup>89</sup> Uncertainties remain regarding mRNA vaccines, for example related to their effects on menstruation<sup>90</sup>, shingles<sup>91</sup>, or the overall safety of current formulations in younger adults and children as well as evidence in support of booster vaccination.<sup>92</sup>

There are two other theoretical problems that could be factored into mandatory programs from a precautionary standpoint: original antigenic sin and the non-specific effects of vaccines. Original antigenic sin refers to the decreased ability of an individual to respond to a new viral variant because the immune system has been “locked” onto the original immunogen.<sup>93</sup> While data has not shown this to be true with certainty for Covid-19 it cannot yet be ruled out as an important side effect of repeat vaccination including with the new bivalent booster. Non-specific effects of vaccination refers to the effects of a vaccine on overall health and all-cause mortality, which have been shown to differ based on the type of vaccine (live vs. non-live) and age/sex.<sup>94,95</sup> Both of these theoretical issues are at the frontiers of our current knowledge of vaccinology and are rarely considered in the media and by the lay public. We cite these examples to prove our main point: proportionality of mandates should account for the precautionary principle in the context of uncertain evidence that benefits outweigh risks and harms. The net effect of these uncertainties, combined with other factors such as the rising prevalence of post-infection immunity<sup>13</sup>, is that future risk-benefit assessments of mRNA vaccines may be even less favourable. Further, with vaccination mandates, young males in particular are being coerced into assuming a documented, albeit very small, risk of death related to vaccination<sup>69,70</sup> for, in most cases of booster vaccination, an uncertain individual and societal benefit.

#### **4.3. Lack of proportionate public health benefit**

Proportionality, a key principle in public health ethics, requires that the benefits of a public health policy must be expected to outweigh harms, including harms arising from the restriction of individual liberty.<sup>1,5-8,86</sup> Where mass vaccination involves harm to a minority of individuals or coercion or undue inducements are used to increase vaccine uptake, proportionality requires



that these considerations be outweighed by public health benefits, typically in the form of reduced transmission from vaccinated individuals to others.<sup>96</sup>

Covid-19 booster mandates often involve a degree of coercion, including the threat of loss of access to education and free choice of occupation.<sup>96</sup> Contrary to those who restrict the concept of coercion to situations of a direct threat to something people should have access to as a matter of right<sup>97</sup>, we endorse here a broader concept of coercion that includes situations of structural pressure that deprive people of reasonable options.<sup>98</sup> To be ethically acceptable, such severe restrictions of individual liberty need to be justified not only by an individual benefit but by the expectation that vaccination reduces harm to others. Booster doses of Covid-19 vaccines provide no lasting reduction in the probability of infection or transmission<sup>27-29</sup> and extremely low expected benefits to young healthy individuals, especially those who have already been infected.<sup>31-33,100-102</sup> The net expected harms to individuals and the harms of coercive mandates themselves are not counterbalanced by a large public health benefit; such harms and restrictions of liberty are therefore disproportionate and ethically unjustifiable.

#### 4.4. Failure of Reciprocity

The use of booster mandates raises an additional ethical problem of *reciprocity* for institutions of higher education and public health authorities.<sup>103,104</sup> Most vaccines are covered in the US<sup>105</sup>, the Canadian province of Quebec<sup>106</sup>, and 18 other countries<sup>106</sup> by an injury compensation program based on fair (reciprocal) compensation for those who experience a vaccine-related harm. Mandatory vaccines arguably require even stronger protections for individuals who experience harmful consequences that lead to permanent harm<sup>107</sup> because their free choice regarding vaccination has been limited. While institutions of higher education are mandating boosters, the US and Canadian compensation programs have failed to uphold their social justice

responsibility to injured individuals. In the US, Covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics are processed by the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) which is designed to cover epidemics, pandemics and security threats as designated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and as authorised by the PREP Act.<sup>105</sup> As of August 1, 2022, 37 claims have been denied compensation because “the standard of proof for causation was not met” or “a covered injury was not sustained.”<sup>108</sup> No claims have been paid out by the US CICP but one claim for anaphylaxis has been approved for compensation and pay-out is currently pending assessment of eligible expenses.<sup>108</sup>

It is highly problematic that young adults are being mandated to take a third dose—especially given the risk-benefit assessment—while the federal US vaccine injury program has failed to compensate but one Covid-19 vaccine-injured individual.<sup>108</sup> It is also important to note that boosters have been granted an EUA by the FDA, but are still not fully approved.<sup>109</sup> Universities and colleges that mandate Covid-19 boosters are pressuring young adults to receive a vaccine that, in case of injury, has no transparent legal route to adequate compensation. In sum, one core precondition for vaccine mandates is a functioning and fair compensation program, which has not been achieved for Covid-19 vaccines.

#### **4.5. Wider Social Harms**

Strong coercion creates significant social harms. Covid-19 vaccine mandates have often involved a high degree of coercion, effectively ostracising unvaccinated individuals from society. University mandates involve significant coercion in that they exclude unvaccinated people from the benefits of university education (or employment) and thereby entail major infringements to free choice of occupation and freedom of association. When such mandates are not supported by a *compelling* public health justification and where exemptions are not

easily available, the likelihood of reactance and negative social effects are increased.<sup>1</sup> The social harms of university Covid-19 mandates have not been formally studied, but there is reason to think that they may be significant.<sup>1</sup> Policies can have wide-ranging consequences for non-compliance, such as loss of employment, loss of internet use, restriction to off-campus vs. on-campus housing, delays or refusal to process student housing requests, loss of enrolment, a hold placed on grades, inability to use recreational facilities to train for competitive sports or register for class, and delays in ability to repay student loans post-graduation. A number of young adults and professors affected by mandates have outlined publicly their perspectives and the social harms of these policies, such as loss of access to schooling and social services<sup>110</sup>, psychosocial stress, reputational damage and lost income, and threats of being disenrolled or deported.<sup>111</sup> This punitive public health approach may also provoke reactance in young adults<sup>1</sup>, with long-term negative consequences on trust in society and institutions and vaccine confidence in general, including vaccine hesitancy for routine paediatric and adult vaccines, a problem which predated the pandemic and is considered one of the World Health Organization's top ten "threats to global health."<sup>112</sup>

## **5. Objections: possible rationales for mandates**

Despite the considerations above, proponents of university Covid-19 booster mandates might argue that such policies are justified (even if some individuals experience uncompensated harms) because they: (i) help *normalize* compliance with vaccination as a social duty (thereby promoting solidarity or pro-vaccine attitudes that undermine anti-vaccination sentiment) and/or (ii) help to increase the safety of the university environment or wider society. Mandates may help some people "feel better," knowing that everyone in a crowd, dorm, or classroom is vaccinated, that they are among peers that have "done the right thing" and "care about the safety of others." For instance, some faculty and staff may "feel protected" by the new booster

mandate introduced at Western University in Ontario, Canada, on August 22, 2022.<sup>113</sup> From this perspective, if a majority of university policymakers (whether clinical advisory group members, administrators and/or professors) or students *believe* that vaccination should be socialised to promote solidarity, counteract anti-vaccination sentiment, or create a safe environment, then such beliefs (and values) should guide policy.

However, even if many people hold such beliefs and even if such goals are valuable, policy must be responsive to facts. Risk-benefit assessments should remain objective and avoid the use of some people feeling better or safer to justify behavioural rules with sanctions for non-compliance in the absence of rational justification. While many vaccines do improve group safety by reducing transmission, the current generation of Covid-19 vaccines do not provide significant lasting effects of this kind, and repeated doses appear to provide diminishing benefits (in terms of reduced infection) per dose, especially among young adults.<sup>114</sup> It therefore makes little sense to claim that Covid-19 vaccination is a pro-social act (or that the unvaccinated are a disproportionate threat to others). Moreover, it is unclear whether *mandating* Covid-19 boosters will produce a net positive effect on pro-vaccine sentiment in society—in fact, booster mandates appear to be associated with an increase in anti-vaccination beliefs and reduced uptake of other (non-coronavirus) vaccines.<sup>1,86,96</sup> As highlighted above, there are also wider social harms of policies that purport to reduce transmission of a ubiquitous virus: such policies may create a fear of infection among young healthy people (out of proportion to the actual risks) and contribute to worsening mental health which predated the pandemic.<sup>115</sup>

Moreover, the claim that the *socialisation* of compliance with public health measures can justify those measures is problematic for three other reasons. First, such an argument is circular:

compliance is not an end itself; policy must be justified by the expectation of public health benefit. Second, people may have different attitudes to compliance depending on their values (e.g., the views regarding the importance of individual liberty) and experiences (e.g., those with low baseline levels of trust in public health due to negative experiences of health professionals or government agencies). Policies that require people to comply against their values and preferences require ethical justification, especially where voluntary compliance is likely to be lower among those who are disempowered (e.g., students) or marginalised for other reasons<sup>5,116</sup>, for example those from social groups which have been mistreated by government agencies or by the medical system in the past, including in the context of research.<sup>117</sup> Third, the socialisation argument is based, in part, on concepts of civic duty and responsibility to others. Pushing for boosters even when these will not contribute to overall risk reduction runs counter to the responsible use of public resources. Policies that encourage waste of valuable health care resources, to make some feel better, are sending a distorted message about important societal obligations.

The proclivity for university vaccine mandates may also reflect harmful trends toward intolerance in university bureaucracies that value compliance over individual freedoms. Mandates, by their nature, encourage conformity and acquiescence to authority, and exclude those with different views or values. Though universities might take pride in being places that permit the free exchange of ideas, mandates reduce the scope for reasoned debate regarding scientific uncertainties or conflicts of ethical values.<sup>118</sup> For example, how many universities have held public debates about mandatory Covid-19 vaccination? To our knowledge, very few such debates have taken place in North American institutions. We are aware of only one academic event<sup>119</sup> which some of us organised, in which booster mandates were critically debated. Sanctions for lack of full vaccination imposed on university professors who publicly

voiced their opposition against mandates could arguably also have been intended to suppress public debate or be interpreted as such.

## **6. Implications for Broader Covid-19 Vaccine Mandates for Youth in Schools, and Other Institutions**

The arguments presented above are relevant not only to 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, or 5<sup>th</sup> dose booster mandates but also to university or school policies that maintain primary two-dose Covid-19 vaccine mandates in 2022 in the face of high rates of previous SARS-CoV-2 infection. Two dose mandates are being upheld in at least 1000 universities and colleges across the United States, far more than the 300 or so maintaining booster mandates<sup>2</sup>, and also some primary and secondary schools<sup>120</sup> which instituted mandates then extended the deadline when it was apparent that serious inequities in access to education would result.<sup>121</sup> It is even harder to justify a two-dose primary vaccine mandate in late 2022 than when such policies began in mid-2021.<sup>46</sup> Consistent with our argument above, the now high prevalence of prior infection, data regarding the lack of sustained transmission reduction by current vaccines, and the age at peak risk for myo/pericarditis being college-bound students ages 17–19 all undermine the case for two-dose vaccine mandates. We would therefore urge universities and schools to rescind all Covid-19 vaccine mandates. Strong statements in support of mandates made in 2021 by organisations such as the Association of Bioethics Program Directors in North America<sup>122</sup>, the American Civil Liberties Union<sup>123</sup>, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission<sup>124</sup> should be updated. Such organisations have an ethical obligation to revise these public statements and consider whether they are valid in light of current data.

The continued policy of two-dose mandates may represent status quo bias: when a rule is normalised it remains even when it has no (current) rational basis. The more rules, the more

paperwork and cumbersome “busy work” that administrators and young students and professionals need to jump through. Yet rules come with consequences: how much are universities, corporations, consulting firms and the military paying in staff time to monitor and maintain vaccine mandates? How much time and energy are young adults using to comply with these policies? How much frustration and psychosocial stress is this causing? What about attrition from institutions and the military at times when the labour market and recruitment is difficult? When vaccine mandates are unethical, individuals may have an ethical duty to oppose them, in part to promote tolerance and prevent further bureaucratic encroachment and disenfranchisement of individuals with reasoned arguments against such mandates. Finally, we argue that institutions have an ethical duty to evaluate the effectiveness of such programs if the status quo is to be maintained.

## 7. Conclusion

Based on public data provided by the CDC<sup>18</sup>, we estimate that approximately 22,000 to 30,000 previous *uninfected* young adults ages 18–29 years must be boosted with an mRNA vaccine to prevent one Covid-19 hospitalisation. Given the fact that this estimate does not take into account the protection conferred by prior infection nor a risk-adjustment for comorbidity status, this should be considered a conservative and optimistic assessment of benefit. Our estimate shows that university Covid-19 vaccine mandates are likely to cause net expected harms to young healthy adults—between 18 and 98 serious adverse events requiring hospitalisation and 1373 to 3234 disruptions of daily activities—that is not outweighed by a proportionate public health benefit. Serious Covid-19 vaccine-associated harms are not adequately compensated for by current US vaccine injury systems. As such, these severe infringements of individual liberty are ethically unjustifiable.

Worse still, mandates are associated with wider social harms. The fact that such policies were implemented despite controversy among experts and without updating the sole publicly available risk-benefit analysis to the current Omicron variants suggests a profound lack of transparency in scientific and regulatory policy making. These findings have implications for mandates in other settings such as schools, corporations, healthcare systems and the military. Policymakers should repeal booster mandates for young adults immediately, ensure pathways to compensation to those who have suffered negative consequences from these policies, provide open access to participant-level clinical trial data to allow risk- and age-stratified harm-benefit analyses of any new vaccines prior to issuing recommendations<sup>125</sup>, and begin what will be a long process of rebuilding trust in public health.

#### **Conflicts of Interest**

We have no interests to declare.

#### **Acknowledgements**

KB would like to thank his wife, Danica Thiessen, for encouraging him to publicly debate Covid-19 vaccine mandates and assistance refining his ethical arguments. AK appreciates her family's support as she participated in vaccine policy research and volunteered to support the local youth ice hockey team's ability to play through the pandemic.



## 739   **References**

- 740   1.    Bardosh K, de Figueiredo A, Gur-Arie R, Jamrozik E, Doidge JC, Lemmens T, et al. The  
741       Unintended Consequences of COVID-19 Vaccine Policy: Why Mandates, Passports, and  
742       Restrictions May Cause more Harm than Good. *BMJ Global Health* 7:e008684.
- 743   2.    Golembeski D. These Are the Colleges Requiring Vaccine Boosters Now. Updated March 18,  
744       2022. Available at [What Colleges Require the COVID-19 Vaccine? | BestColleges](#) Accessed  
745       on August 30, 2022.
- 746   3.    Burt C. Calls for end to COVID-19 vaccine booster mandates growing in higher ed. January 21,  
747       2022. Available at [https://universitybusiness.com/calls-for-end-to-covid-19-vaccine-booster-](https://universitybusiness.com/calls-for-end-to-covid-19-vaccine-booster-mandates-growing-in-higher-ed/)  
748       [mandates-growing-in-higher-ed/](https://universitybusiness.com/calls-for-end-to-covid-19-vaccine-booster-mandates-growing-in-higher-ed/) Accessed on March 28, 2022.
- 749   4.    Block J. US college covid-19 vaccine mandates don't consider immunity or pregnancy, and  
750       may run foul of the law. *BMJ* 2021; 373:n1397 doi:10.1136/bmj.n1397
- 751   5.    World Health Organization. COVID-19 and mandatory vaccination: Ethical considerations:  
752       policy brief. May 30, 2022. Available at [COVID-19 and mandatory vaccination: Ethical](#)  
753       [considerations \(who.int\)](#). Accessed on August 20, 2022.
- 754   6.    Savulescu J. Good reasons to vaccinate: mandatory or payment for risk? *J Med Ethics* 2021  
755       Feb;47(2):78-85. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2020-106821. Epub 2020 Nov 5. PMID: 33154088;  
756       PMCID: PMC7848060.
- 757   7.    Giubilini, Alberto et al. "COVID-19 vaccine: vaccinate the young to protect the old?" *Journal*  
758       *of Law and the Biosciences* 2020(7).
- 759   8.    Williams BM. The Ethics of Selective Mandatory Vaccination for COVID-19. *Public Health*  
760       *Ethics* 2021 Dec 15;15(1):74-86. doi: 10.1093/phe/phab028. PMID: 35702643; PMCID:  
761       PMC9188377.

9. Romero Starke K, Reissig D, Petereit-Haack G, Schmauder S, Nienhaus A, Seidler A. The isolated effect of age on the risk of COVID-19 severe outcomes: a systematic review with meta-analysis. *BMJ Glob Health*. 2021 Dec;6(12):e006434. doi: 10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006434. PMID: 34916273; PMCID: PMC8678541.
10. Choi JH, Choi SH, Yun KW. Risk Factors for Severe COVID-19 in Children: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. *J Korean Med Sci*. 2022 Feb 7;37(5):e35. doi: 10.3346/jkms.2022.37.e35. PMID: 35132841; PMCID: PMC8822112.
11. Ughi N, Del Gaudio F, Dicuonzo A, Orso M, Micheloni G, Puoti M, Pani A, Scaglione F, Zoppini L, Rossetti C, Epis OM, Bellavia G, Girolodi S, Moreno M, Bosio M. Host factors and history of SARS-CoV-2 infection impact the reactogenicity of BNT162b2 mRNA vaccine: results from a cross-sectional survey on 7,014 workers in healthcare. *Eur Rev Med Pharmacol Sci*. 2021 Dec;25(24):7985-7996. doi: 10.26355/eurrev\_202112\_27649. PMID: 34982462.
12. Karlstad Ø, Hovi P, Husby A, Härkänen T, Selmer RM, Pihlström N, Hansen JV, Nohynek H, Gunnes N, Sundström A, Wohlfahrt J, Nieminen TA, Grünewald M, Gulseth HL, Hviid A, Ljung R. SARS-CoV-2 Vaccination and Myocarditis in a Nordic Cohort Study of 23 Million Residents. *JAMA Cardiol*. 2022 Jun 1;7(6):600-612. doi: 10.1001/jamacardio.2022.0583. PMID: 35442390; PMCID: PMC9021987.
13. Clarke KE, Jones JM, Deng Y, et al. Seroprevalence of Infection-Induced SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies — United States, September 2021–February 2022. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep* 2022;71:606-608. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7117e3>external icon
14. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Joint CDC and FDA Statement on Vaccine Boosters. July 8, 2021. Available at <https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/s-07082021.html> accessed on August 20, 2022.

- 785 15. Food and Drug Administration. Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for an Unapproved  
786 Product. September 21, 2021. Available at <https://www.fda.gov/media/152432/download> page  
787 5. Accessed on March 28, 2022.
- 788 16. Krause PR, Fleming TR, Peto R, Longini IM, Figueroa JP, Sterne JAC, et al. Considerations in  
789 boosting COVID-19 vaccine immune responses. *The Lancet* 2021;398(10308): pp1377-1380.  
790 doi: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)02046-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02046-8)
- 791 17. Doshi P, Godlee F, Abbasi K. Covid-19 vaccines and treatments: we must have raw data, now.  
792 *BMJ*. 2022;376:o102. Available at <https://www.bmj.com/content/376/bmj.o102.short> Accessed  
793 March 28, 2022.
- 794 18. Oliver S. Updates to the Evidence to Recommendation Framework: Pfizer-BioNTech and  
795 Moderna COVID-19 vaccine booster doses. ACIP Meeting. November 19, 2021. (Slides 26, 29,  
796 30, 31, 37) Available at <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2021-11-19/06-COVID-Oliver-508.pdf> Accessed on March 28, 2022.
- 798 19. Andrews, N., Stowe, J., Kirsebom, F. et al. Effectiveness of COVID-19 booster vaccines  
799 against COVID-19-related symptoms, hospitalization and death in England. *Nat Med* (2022).  
800 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-022-01699-1>
- 801 20. Bar-On YM, Goldberg Y, Mandel M, Bodenheimer O, Freedman L, Alroy-Preis S, et al.  
802 Protection against Covid-19 by BNT162b2 Booster across Age Groups. *N Eng J Med* 2021;  
803 385:2421-2430. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2115926.
- 804 21. Link-Gelles R, Levy ME, Gaglani M, et al. Effectiveness of 2, 3, and 4 COVID-19 mRNA  
805 Vaccine Doses Among Immunocompetent Adults During Periods when SARS-CoV-2 Omicron  
806 BA.1 and BA.2/BA.2.12.1 Sublineages Predominated — VISION Network, 10 States,  
807 December 2021–June 2022. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep* 2022;71:931–939. DOI:  
808 <http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7129e1>

- 809 22. Li X, Lai FTT, Chua GT, et al. Myocarditis Following COVID-19 BNT162b2 Vaccination  
810 Among Adolescents in Hong Kong. *JAMA Pediatr.* 2022;176(6):612–614.  
811 doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2022.0101.
- 812 23. Oliver S. Evidence to Recommendation Framework: Moderna COVID-19 vaccine in children  
813 ages 6 months – 5 years & Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine in children ages 6 months – 4  
814 years. (Slide 66) June 17, 2022. Available at  
815 [https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2022-06-17-18/03-covid-oliver-](https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2022-06-17-18/03-covid-oliver-508.pdf)  
816 [508.pdf](https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2022-06-17-18/03-covid-oliver-508.pdf) accessed on August 20, 2022.
- 817 24. Havergal C. No Plans to Require Vaccines at English Universities. *Inside Higher Ed* August 6,  
818 2021. Available at [https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/08/06/no-plans-require-](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/08/06/no-plans-require-vaccines-english-universities)  
819 [vaccines-english-universities](https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/08/06/no-plans-require-vaccines-english-universities) Accessed on March 28, 2022.
- 820 25. Andrews N, Stowe J, Kirsebom F, Toffa S, Rikeard T, Gallagher E, et al. Covid-19 Vaccine  
821 Effectiveness against the Omicron (B.1.1.529) Variant. *N Eng J Med*  
822 doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa2119451
- 823 26. Accorsi EK, Britton A, Fleming-Dutra KE, Smith ZR, Shang N, Gordana D, et al. Association  
824 Between 3 Doses of mRNA COVID-19 Vaccine and Symptomatic Infection Caused by the  
825 SARS-CoV-2 Omicron and Delta Variants. *JAMA* 2022;327(7):639–651.  
826 doi:10.1001/jama.2022.0470.
- 827 27. Singanayagam A, Hakki S, Dunning J, Madon KJ, Crone MA, Koycheva A, et al. Community  
828 transmission and viral load kinetics of the SARS-CoV-2 delta (B.1.617.2) variant in vaccinated  
829 and unvaccinated individuals in the UK: a prospective, longitudinal, cohort study. *The Lancet*  
830 2021;22(2):183-195. doi: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(21\)00648-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(21)00648-4)
- 831 28. Boucau J, Marino C, Regan J, Uddin R, Choudhary MC, Flynn JP, Chen G, Stuckwisch AM,  
832 Mathews J, Liew MY, Singh A, Lipiner T, Kittilson A, Melberg M, Li Y, Gilbert R, Reynolds  
833 Z, Iyer SL, Chamberlin GC, Vyas TD, Goldberg MB, Vyas JM, Li JZ, Lemieux JE, Siedner

- 834 MJ, Barczak AK. Duration of Shedding of Culturable Virus in SARS-CoV-2 Omicron (BA.1).  
835 *N Engl J Med* 2022; 387:275-277. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2202092
- 836 29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Omicron Variant: What You Need to Know.  
837 Available at: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html>  
838 Accessed on August 20, 2022.
- 839 30. Mulligan CB, Arnott RD. NON-COVID EXCESS DEATHS, 2020-21: COLLATERAL  
840 DAMAGE OF POLICY CHOICES? National Bureau of Economic Research. June 2022.  
841 Available at [https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w30104/w30104.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30104/w30104.pdf) Accessed  
842 on August 20, 2022.
- 843 31. Pilz S, Theiler-Schwetz V, Trummer C, Krause R, Ioannidis J.P.A. SARS-CoV-2 reinfections:  
844 Overview of efficacy and duration of natural and hybrid immunity, *Environmental Research*  
845 2022;209:112911. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2022.112911>
- 846 32. Wei, J., Pouwels, K.B., Stoesser, N. et al. Antibody responses and correlates of protection in the  
847 general population after two doses of the ChAdOx1 or BNT162b2 vaccines. *Nat Med* 2022;28:  
848 1072–1082. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-022-01721-6>
- 849 33. Nordström P, Ballin M, Nordström A. Risk of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection and COVID-19  
850 hospitalisation in individuals with natural and hybrid immunity: a retrospective, total  
851 population cohort study in Sweden. *The Lancet Infectious Diseases* 2022;22(6):p781-790.  
852 Available at [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(22\)00143-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00143-8) accessed on August 22, 2022.
- 853 34. Offit PA. Covid-19 Boosters - Where from Here? *N Engl J Med*. 2022 Apr 28;386(17):1661-  
854 1662. doi: 10.1056/NEJMc2203329. Epub 2022 Apr 13. PMID: 35417633; PMCID:  
855 PMC9020580.
- 856 35. Crist, C. Fauci: ‘Many, Many’ More Vaccine Mandates Needed to End Pandemic. WebMD.  
857 September 13, 2021. Available at [Fauci: ‘Many, Many’ More Vaccine Mandates Needed to](https://www.webmd.com/healthcare/news/20210913/fauci-many-many-more-vaccine-mandates-needed-to-end-pandemic)  
858 [End Pandemic \(webmd.com\)](https://www.webmd.com/healthcare/news/20210913/fauci-many-many-more-vaccine-mandates-needed-to-end-pandemic) Accessed on August 30, 2022.

36. Heriot GS, Jamrozik E. Imagination and remembrance: what role should historical epidemiology play in a world bewitched by mathematical modelling of COVID-19 and other epidemics? *Hist Philos Life Sci.* 2021 Jun 7;43(2):81. doi: 10.1007/s40656-021-00422-6. PMID: 34100155; PMCID: PMC8183318.
37. Set i bakspejlet fik vi ikke meget ud af at vaccinere børnene, erkender Brostrøm. TV2. June 22, 2022. Available at [Set i bakspejlet fik vi ikke meget ud af at vaccinere børnene, erkender Brostrøm - TV 2](#) Accessed on August 30, 2022.
38. Vaccination mod covid-19. Sundhedsstyrelsen. Available at [Vaccination mod covid-19 - Sundhedsstyrelsen](#) Accessed on August 30, 2022.
39. COVID-19 Forecasting Team. Variation in the COVID-19 infection–fatality ratio by age, time, and geography during the pre-vaccine era: a systematic analysis. *The Lancet.* 2022;399(10334):1469-1488.
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Response. Rates of COVID-19 Cases or Deaths by Age Group and Vaccination Status Public Use Data (version date: August 19, 2022).
41. JCVI statement on the COVID-19 booster vaccination programme for autumn 2022: update 15 August 2022. Available at [JCVI statement on the COVID-19 booster vaccination programme for autumn 2022: update 15 August 2022 - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#). Accessed on August 22, 2022.
42. Kirsebom FJM, Andrews N, Stowe J, Toffa S, Sachdeva R, Gallagher E, et al. COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness against the omicron (BA.2) variant in England. *The Lancet Infectious Diseases.* 2022;22(7): 931-933.
43. Altarawneh HN, Chemaitelly H, Ayoub HH, Tang P, Hasan MR, Yassine HM, et al. Effects of Previous Infection and Vaccination on Symptomatic Omicron Infections. *New Engl J Med*

2022; 387:21-34 DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa2203965 Available at [Effects of Previous Infection and Vaccination on Symptomatic Omicron Infections | NEJM](#) Accessed on August 22, 2022.

44. Al-Aly, Z., Bowe, B. & Xie, Y. Long COVID after breakthrough SARS-CoV-2 infection. *Nat Med.* 2022;28:1461–1467. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-022-01840-0>

45. Pham B, Rios P, Radhakrishnan A, et al Comparative-effectiveness research of COVID-19 treatment: a rapid scoping review. *BMJ Open* 2022;12:e045115. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2020-045115

46. Krug A, Stevenson J, Høeg B. BNT162b2 Vaccine-Associated Myo/Pericarditis in Adolescents: A Stratified Risk-Benefit Analysis. *Eur J Clinical Inv* 2022;52(5). <https://doi.org/10.1111/eci.13759>

47. Ulloa AC, Buchan SA, Daneman N, Brown KA. Estimates of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron Variant Severity in Ontario, Canada. *JAMA* Published online February 17, 2022. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.2274.

48. Rosenblum HG, Gee J, Liu R, Marquez PL, Zhang B, Strid P, et al. Safety of mRNA vaccines administered during the initial 6 months of the US COVID-19 vaccination programme: an observational study of reports to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System and v-safe, *The Lancet Infectious Diseases* 2022;22(6):802-812. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(22\)00054-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00054-8)

49. National Institutes of Health. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Rules and Policies for Clinical Research: Safety Reporting and Pharmacovigilance. Available at [Safety Reporting and Pharmacovigilance | NIH: National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases](#) Accessed on August 30, 2022.

50. CDC. Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE): Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and Janssen COVID-19 booster doses. October 29, 2021. Available at <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/recs/grade/covid-19-booster-doses.html#table-03a>

- 908 51. Shimabukuro T. Update on myocarditis following mRNA COVID-29 vaccination. Advisory  
 909 Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). June 23, 2022. Available at: Update on  
 910 myocarditis following mRNA COVID-19 vaccination (cdc.gov). Slides 10 and 23. Accessed on  
 911 August 20, 2022.
- 912 52. Shimabukuro T. Myocarditis following mRNA COVID-19 vaccination. Advisory Committee  
 913 on Immunization Practices (ACIP). July 19, 2022. Available at: Myocarditis following mRNA  
 914 COVID-19 vaccination (cdc.gov). Slides 11 and 23. Accessed on August 20, 2022.
- 915 53. Sharff KA, Dancoes DM, Longueil JL, Lewis PF, Johnson ES. Myopericarditis after COVID-  
 916 19 Booster Dose Vaccination. *Am J Card* 2022;172:165-166.  
 917 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amjcard.2022.02.039>
- 918 54. Friedensohn L, Levin D, Fadlon-Derai M, et al. Myocarditis Following a Third BNT162b2  
 919 Vaccination Dose in Military Recruits in Israel. *JAMA* Apr 26;327(16):1611-1612.  
 920 doi:10.1001/jama.2022.4425.
- 921 55. Hause AM, Baggs J, Gee J, et al. Safety Monitoring of an Additional Dose of COVID-19  
 922 Vaccine — United States, August 12–September 19, 2021. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep*  
 923 2021;70:1379–1384. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7039e4>
- 924 56. Beatty AL, Peyser ND, Butcher XE, et al. Analysis of COVID-19 Vaccine Type and Adverse  
 925 Effects Following Vaccination. *JAMA Netw Open* 2021;4(12):e2140364.  
 926 doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.40364
- 927 57. Monforte A, Tavelli A, Perrone PM, Za A, Razzini K, Tomasoni D. Association between  
 928 previous infection with SARS CoV-2 and the risk of self-reported symptoms after mRNA  
 929 BNT162b2 vaccination: Data from 3,078 health care workers. *EClinicalMedicine*  
 930 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eclinm.2021.100914> Accessed May 11, 2022.



58. Hause AM, Baggs J, Marquez P, et al. Safety Monitoring of COVID-19 Vaccine Booster Doses Among Adults — United States, September 22, 2021–February 6, 2022. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep* 2022;71:249–254. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7107e1>
59. Sharff, KA, Dancoes, DM, Longueil, JL, Johnson, ES, Lewis, PF. Risk of myopericarditis following COVID-19 mRNA vaccination in a large integrated health system: A comparison of completeness and timeliness of two methods. *Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Saf.* 2022;31(8): 921-925. doi:10.1002/pds.5439
60. Morello R, Pepe M, Martino L, Lazzareschi I, Chiaretti A, Gatto A, Curatola A. COVID-19 review shows that benefits of vaccinating children and adolescents appear to outweigh risks of post-vaccination myopericarditis. *Acta Paediatr.* 2022 Jun 23;10.1111/apa.16462. doi: 10.1111/apa.16462. Epub ahead of print. PMID: 35735066; PMCID: PMC9350405.
61. Writing Committee, Gluckman, T. J., Bhav, N. M., Allen, L. A., Chung, E. H., Spatz, E. S., Verma, A. K, et al. 2022 ACC expert consensus decision pathway on cardiovascular sequelae of COVID-19 in adults: myocarditis and other myocardial involvement, post-acute sequelae of SARS-CoV-2 infection, and return to play: a report of the American College of cardiology solution set oversight Committee. *Journal of the American College of Cardiology* 2022;79(17):1717-1756.
62. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Estimated COVID-19 Burden. August 12, 2022. Available at [Estimated COVID-19 Burden | CDC](#). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
63. Buchan SA, Seo CY, Johnson C, et al. Epidemiology of Myocarditis and Pericarditis Following mRNA Vaccination by Vaccine Product, Schedule, and Interdose Interval Among Adolescents and Adults in Ontario, Canada. *JAMA Netw Open.* 2022;5(6):e2218505. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.18505

64. Witberg G, Barda N, Hoss S, Richter I, Weissman M, Aviv Y, et al. Myocarditis after Covid-19 Vaccination in a Large Health Care Organization. *N Engl J Med* 2021; 385:2132-2139.  
<https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2110737>
65. Shimabukuro T. Update on myocarditis following mRNA COVID-19 vaccination. Vaccines and Related Biologic Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC). June 7, 2022. Available at: [Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee June 7, 2022 Meeting Presentation- COVID19- Update on Myocarditis following mRNA vaccination \(fda.gov\)](#)  
Accessed on 12 July 2022
66. Schauer J, Buddhe S, Gulhane A, Chikkabyrappa SM, Law Y, Portman MA, et al. Persistent Cardiac MRI Findings in a Cohort of Adolescents with post COVID-19 mRNA vaccine myopericarditis. *The J of Pediatrics* 2022;245:233-237. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2022.03.032> Accessed on March 28, 2022.
67. Hadley, S.M., Prakash, A., Baker, A.L. et al. Follow-up cardiac magnetic resonance in children with vaccine-associated myocarditis. *Eur J Pediatr* 2022;181:2879–2883.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00431-022-04482-z>
68. Patone M, Mei XW, Handunnetthi L, Dixon S, Zaccardi F, Shankar-Hari M, et al. Risk of myocarditis following sequential COVID-19 vaccinations by age and sex. *Circulation*  
Published August 22, 2022. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.122.059970> Accessed on August 24, 2022.
69. Mevorach D, Anis E, Cedar N, Bromberg M, Haas EJ, Nadir E, et al. Myocarditis after BNT162b2 mRNA Vaccine against Covid-19 in Israel. *N Engl J Med* 2021;385:2140-2149.  
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa2109730
70. Choi S, Lee S, Seo JW, Kim MJ, Jeon YH, Park JH, Lee JK, Yeo NS. Myocarditis-induced Sudden Death after BNT162b2 mRNA COVID-19 Vaccination in Korea: Case Report

978 Focusing on Histopathological Findings. *J Korean Med Sci.* 2021;36(40):e286. doi:  
979 10.3346/jkms.2021.36.e286. PMID: 34664804; PMCID: PMC8524235.

980 71. CBER assessment of a single booster dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine (0.3  
981 mL) administered to individuals 16 to 17 years of age after completion of a primary vaccination  
982 series with the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine or COMIRNATY. December 8, 2021.  
983 Available at [Pfizer-Biontech COVID-19 Vaccine Review Memorandum 12142021 \(fda.gov\)](#).  
984 Accessed on August 24, 2022.

985 72. Loosen, S. H., Bohlken, J., Weber, K., Konrad, M., Luedde, T., Roderburg, C., & Kostev, K.  
986 Factors Associated with Non-Severe Adverse Reactions after Vaccination against SARS-CoV-  
987 2: A Cohort Study of 908,869 Outpatient Vaccinations in Germany. *Vaccines* 2022;10(4):566.

988 73. Haas, J. W., Bender, F. L., Ballou, S., Kelley, J. M., Wilhelm, M., Miller, F. G., ... & Kaptchuk,  
989 T. J. Frequency of adverse events in the placebo arms of COVID-19 vaccine trials: A  
990 systematic review and meta-analysis. *JAMA Network Open.* 2022;5(1), e2143955-e2143955.

991 74. Gargano JW, Wallace M, Hadler SC, Langley G, Su JR, Oster ME, Broder KR, Gee J,  
992 Weintraub E, Shimabukuro T, Scobie HM, Moulia D, Markowitz LE, Wharton M, McNally  
993 VV, Romero JR, Talbot HK, Lee GM, Daley MF, Oliver SE. Use of mRNA COVID-19  
994 Vaccine After Reports of Myocarditis Among Vaccine Recipients: Update from the Advisory  
995 Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, June 2021. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly*  
996 *Rep.* 2021 Jul 9;70(27):977-982. doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm7027e2. PMID: 34237049; PMCID:  
997 PMC8312754.

998 75. Perez JL. Efficacy & Safety of BNT162b2 booster - C4591031 2 month interim analysis. ACIP.  
999 November 19, 2021. Available at  
1000 [https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2021-11-19/02-COVID-Perez-](https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2021-11-19/02-COVID-Perez-508.pdf)  
1001 [508.pdf](https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2021-11-19/02-COVID-Perez-508.pdf) Accessed on August 24, 2022.

- 1002 76. Petersen, M. B., Bor, A., Jørgensen, F., & Lindholt, M. F. Transparent communication about  
1003 negative features of COVID-19 vaccines decreases acceptance but increases trust. *Proceedings*  
1004 *of the National Academy of Sciences* 2021;118(29). e2024597118.
- 1005 77. Witman AB, Park DM, Hardin SB. How do patients want physicians to handle mistakes? A  
1006 survey of internal medicine patients in an academic setting. *Arch Intern Med.* 1996;  
1007 156(22):2565-9. PMID: 8951299.
- 1008 78. Abraham J. The pharmaceutical industry as a political player. *The Lancet.*  
1009 2002;360(9344):1498-1502. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(02\)11477-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(02)11477-2)
- 1010 79. Jorgensen PD. Pharmaceuticals, political money, and public policy: a theoretical and empirical  
1011 agenda. *J Law Med Ethics.* 2013;41(3):561-70. doi: 10.1111/jlme.12065. PMID: 24088146.
- 1012 80. ECDC and EMA highlight considerations for additional and booster doses of COVID-19  
1013 vaccines. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. September 2, 2021.  
1014 [https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-considerations-additional-and-](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-considerations-additional-and-booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines)  
1015 [booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-considerations-additional-and-booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines) .
- 1016 81. COVID-19 Vaccine Boosters. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. July 20, 2022.  
1017 Available at <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/booster-shot.html>. Accessed  
1018 on August 24, 2022.
- 1019 82. ECDC and EMA update recommendations on additional booster doses of COVID-19 vaccines.  
1020 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. July 11, 2022. Available at  
1021 [https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-update-recommendations-](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-update-recommendations-additional-booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines)  
1022 [additional-booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ecdc-and-ema-update-recommendations-additional-booster-doses-covid-19-vaccines). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1023 83. JCVI statement on COVID-19 vaccination of children aged 12 to 15 years: 3 September 2021.  
1024 Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation. Available at  
1025 [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jcvi-statement-september-2021-covid-19-](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jcvi-statement-september-2021-covid-19)

- 1026 [vaccination-of-children-aged-12-to-15-years/jevi-statement-on-covid-19-vaccination-of-](#)  
1027 [children-aged-12-to-15-years-3-september-2021](#). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1028 84. John SD. How low can you go? Justified hesitancy and the ethics of childhood vaccination  
1029 against COVID-19. *J Med Ethics*. 2022 Feb 25:medethics-2021-108097. doi:  
1030 10.1136/medethics-2021-108097. Epub ahead of print. PMID: 35217530; PMCID:  
1031 PMC8914403.
- 1032 85. Single dose of COVID-19 vaccine to be offered to 12-15 year olds. Department of Health and  
1033 Social Care. September 22, 2021. Available at [https://www.gov.uk/article/185637/Single-dose-](https://www.gov.uk/article/185637/Single-dose-of-COVID-19-vaccine-to-be-offered-to-12-15-year-olds)  
1034 [of-COVID-19-vaccine-to-be-offered-to-12-15-year-olds](https://www.gov.uk/article/185637/Single-dose-of-COVID-19-vaccine-to-be-offered-to-12-15-year-olds). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1035 86. Vaccine Mandates. Institute for Government. March 31, 2022. Available at  
1036 <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/vaccine-mandates>. Accessed on August  
1037 24, 2022.
- 1038 87. Slifka, A. M., Park, B., Gao, L., & Slifka, M. K. Incidence of tetanus and diphtheria in relation  
1039 to adult vaccination schedules. *Clinical Infectious Diseases* 2021;72(2):285-292.
- 1040 88. Withdrawal of Rotavirus Vaccine Recommendation. Centers for Disease Control and  
1041 Prevention. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*. 1999;48(43):1007.  
1042 <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4843a5.htm>
- 1043 89. Johnson & Johnson's Janssen COVID-19 Vaccine: Overview and Safety. Centers for Disease  
1044 Control and Prevention. Available at [https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/janssen.html)  
1045 [ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/janssen.html](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/janssen.html). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1046 90. Lee KMN, Junkis EJ, Luo C, Fatima UA, Cox ML, Clancy KBH. Investigating trends in those  
1047 who experience menstrual bleeding changes after SARS-CoV-2 vaccination. *Science Advances*  
1048 2022;8(28). <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abm7201>

- 1049 91. Aksu SB, Öztürk GZ. A rare case of shingles after COVID-19 vaccine: is it a possible adverse  
1050 effect? *Clin Exp Vaccine Res.* 2021;10(2):198-201. doi: 10.7774/cevr.2021.10.2.198. Epub  
1051 2021 May 31. PMID: 34222134; PMCID: PMC8217581.
- 1052 92. COVID-19 vaccine effectiveness in adolescents aged 12–17 years and interim public health  
1053 considerations for administration of a booster dose. European Centre for Disease Prevention  
1054 and Control. February 8, 2022. Available at [https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/covid-19-vaccine-effectiveness-adolescents-and-interim-considerations-for-booster-dose)  
1055 [data/covid-19-vaccine-effectiveness-adolescents-and-interim-considerations-for-booster-dose](https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/covid-19-vaccine-effectiveness-adolescents-and-interim-considerations-for-booster-dose)  
1056 Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1057 93. Vatti A, Monsalve DM, Pacheco Y, Chang C, Anaya JM, Gershwin ME. Original antigenic sin:  
1058 A comprehensive review. *J Autoimmun.* 2017;83:12-21. doi: 10.1016/j.jaut.2017.04.008. Epub  
1059 2017 May 5. PMID: 28479213.
- 1060 94. Aaby P, Benn CS, Flanagan KL, Klein SL, Kollmann TR, Lynn DJ, Shann F. The non-specific  
1061 and sex-differential effects of vaccines. *Nat Rev Immunol.* 2020;20(8):464-470. doi:  
1062 10.1038/s41577-020-0338-x. Epub 2020 May 27. PMID: 32461674; PMCID: PMC7252419.
- 1063 95. Aaby P, Netea MG, Benn CS. Beneficial non-specific effects of live vaccines against COVID-  
1064 19 and other unrelated infections. *The Lancet Infectious Diseases.* Online first. August 26,  
1065 2022. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(22\)00498-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00498-4)
- 1066 96. Attwell K, C Navin M. Childhood Vaccination Mandates: Scope, Sanctions, Severity,  
1067 Selectivity, and Salience. *Milbank Q.* 2019;97(4):978–1014. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12417.  
1068 Epub ahead of print. PMID: 31529546; PMCID: PMC6904257.
- 1069 97. Wertheimer A & Miller FG, “Payment for research participation: A coercive offer?” *J Med*  
1070 *Ethics* 2008;34:389–392. doi:10.1136/jme.2007.021857
- 1071 98. Fisher JA. Expanding the Frame of Voluntariness in Informed Consent: Structural Coercion and  
1072 the Power of Social and Economic Context. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 2013;23: 355-  
1073 379. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journal/107> <https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2013.0018>

- 1074 99. Bambery B, Douglas T, Selgelid MJ, Maslen H, Giubilini A, Pollard AJ, Savulescu J. Influenza  
1075 Vaccination Strategies Should Target Children. *Public Health Ethics*. 2017;11(2):221-234. doi:  
1076 10.1093/phe/phx021. PMID: 30135702; PMCID: PMC6093440.
- 1077 100. Gazit S, Saciuk Y, Perez G, Peretz A, Pitzer V E, Patalon T et al. Short term, relative  
1078 effectiveness of four doses versus three doses of BNT162b2 vaccine in people aged 60 years  
1079 and older in Israel: retrospective, test negative, case-control study. *BMJ* 2022; 377:e071113  
1080 doi:10.1136/bmj-2022-071113.
- 1081 101. SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern and variants under investigation in England Technical  
1082 briefing: Update on hospitalisation and vaccine effectiveness for Omicron VOC-21NOV-01  
1083 (B.1.1.529). UK Health Security Agency. December 31, 2021. Available at  
1084 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/fi](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1045619/Technical-Briefing-31-Dec-2021-Omicron_severity_update.pdf)  
1085 [le/1045619/Technical-Briefing-31-Dec-2021-Omicron\\_severity\\_update.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1045619/Technical-Briefing-31-Dec-2021-Omicron_severity_update.pdf) Accessed on  
1086 August 24, 2022.
- 1087 102. Wilder-Smith A. What is the vaccine effect on reducing transmission in the context of the  
1088 SARS-CoV-2 delta variant? *The Lancet Infect Dis*. 2022;22(2):152-153.  
1089 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(21\)00690-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(21)00690-3)
- 1090 103. Holm S. A general approach to compensation for losses incurred due to public health  
1091 interventions in the infectious disease context. *Monash Bioeth Rev*. 2020 Dec;38(Suppl 1):32-  
1092 46. doi: 10.1007/s40592-020-00104-2. PMID: 32130682; PMCID: PMC7095444.
- 1093 104. Benn CS, Fisker AB, Rieckmann A, Sørup S, Aaby P. Vaccinology: time to change the  
1094 paradigm? *Lancet Infect Dis*. 2020 Oct;20(10):e274-e283. doi: 10.1016/S1473-3099(19)30742-  
1095 X. Epub 2020 Jul 6. PMID: 32645296.
- 1096 105. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP). Health Resources and Services  
1097 Administration. Available at <https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp>. Accessed on August 24, 2022.

- 1098 106. Vaccine Injury Support Program. Government of Canada. Available at  
1099 <https://vaccineinjurysupport.ca/en>. Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1100 107. Gill JR, Tashjian R, Duncanson E. Autopsy Histopathologic Cardiac Findings in 2 Adolescents  
1101 Following the Second COVID-19 Vaccine Dose. *Arch Pathol Lab Med*. 2022;146(8):925-929.  
1102 doi: 10.5858/arpa.2021-0435-SA. PMID: 35157759.
- 1103 108. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP). Health Resources and Services  
1104 Administration. Data on CICP. Available at [Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program](#)  
1105 [\(CICP\) Data | HRSA](#) Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1106 109. Comirnaty and Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine. Food and Drug Administration.  
1107 Available at [https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/comirnaty-and-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine#comirnaty)  
1108 [2019-covid-19/comirnaty-and-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine#comirnaty](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/comirnaty-and-pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine#comirnaty) Accessed on  
1109 August 24, 2022.
- 1110 110. Olivier, M. Emory restricts WiFi for students noncompliant with booster requirements, sees  
1111 slight increase in COVID-19 cases. *The Emory Wheel*. 2022; 4: 6. Available from  
1112 [https://emorywheel.com/emory-restricts-wifi-for-students-noncompliant-with-booster-](https://emorywheel.com/emory-restricts-wifi-for-students-noncompliant-with-booster-requirements-sees-slight-increase-in-covid-19-cases/)  
1113 [requirements-sees-slight-increase-in-covid-19-cases/](https://emorywheel.com/emory-restricts-wifi-for-students-noncompliant-with-booster-requirements-sees-slight-increase-in-covid-19-cases/)
- 1114 111. Braganca, D. Stanford to International Students: Get the Booster or Face Deportation | Opinion.  
1115 Newsweek March 31, 2022. Available at [https://www.newsweek.com/stanford-international-](https://www.newsweek.com/stanford-international-students-get-booster-face-deportation-opinion-1693073)  
1116 [students-get-booster-face-deportation-opinion-1693073](https://www.newsweek.com/stanford-international-students-get-booster-face-deportation-opinion-1693073)
- 1117 112. Godlee F. What should we do about vaccine hesitancy? *BMJ*. 2019;365:l4044  
1118 <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.l4044>
- 1119 113. Bhargava I. Some Western students confused why university mandated a 3rd COVID-19 shot  
1120 after they'd paid tuition. CBC. August 24, 2022. Available at  
1121 <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/western-students-covid-mandates-1.6560239>  
1122 Accessed on August 24, 2022.



- 1123 114. Regev-Yochay G, Mandelboim M, Amit S, Nemet I, Joseph G, Mendelson E, et al. Efficacy of  
1124 a Fourth Dose of Covid-19 mRNA Vaccine against Omicron. *N Engl J Med* 2022;386:1377-  
1125 1380 DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc2202542
- 1126 115. Lipson SK, Zhou S, Abelson S, Heinze J, Jirsa M, Morigney J, et al. Trends in college student  
1127 mental health and help-seeking by race/ethnicity: Findings from the national healthy minds  
1128 study, 2013–2021. *Journal of Affective Disorders*. 2022;306:138-147.  
1129 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2022.03.038>
- 1130 116. Selgelid MJ. A Moderate Pluralist Approach to Public Health Policy and Ethics. *Public Health*  
1131 *Ethics* 2009;2(2):195–205, <https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/php018>.
- 1132 117. Mosby I. Administering colonial science: Nutrition research and human biomedical  
1133 experimentation in Aboriginal communities and residential schools, 1942–1952. *Social History*.  
1134 2013;46:145–72.
- 1135 118. Haidt, J. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Vintage.  
1136 2013
- 1137 119. The Unintended Consequences of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates: Why They May Cause More  
1138 Harm than Good. Available at (1047) [The Unintended Consequences of COVID-19 Vaccine](#)  
1139 [Mandates: Why They May Cause More Harm than Good - YouTube](#) Accessed on August 30,  
1140 2022.
- 1141 120.. Bonk, V. DC schools require COVID-19 vaccine for students 12 and up. July 19, 2022. *WTOP*  
1142 *News* [https://wtop.com/dc/2022/07/dc-schools-require-covid-19-vaccine-for-students-12-and-](https://wtop.com/dc/2022/07/dc-schools-require-covid-19-vaccine-for-students-12-and-up/)  
1143 [up/](https://wtop.com/dc/2022/07/dc-schools-require-covid-19-vaccine-for-students-12-and-up/)
- 1144 121. Segraves N. DC Extends Deadlines for Student COVID-19 Vaccination, Routine  
1145 Immunizations. August 26, 2022. Available at [DC Extends Deadlines for Student COVID-19](#)  
1146 [Vaccination, Routine Immunizations – NBC4 Washington \(nbcwashington.com\)](#) Accessed on  
1147 August 30, 2022.
- 1148 122. ABPD Statement in Support of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates For All Eligible Americans.  
1149 Association of Bioethics Program Directors. September 22, 2021. Available at

- 1150 <https://www.bioethicsdirectors.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ABPD-Statement-in-Support->  
1151 [of-COVID-19-Vaccine-Mandates\\_FINAL9.22.2021.pdf](#). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1152 123. Mach D, Cole D. Civil Liberties and Vaccine Mandates: Here's Our Take. American Civil  
1153 Liberties Union. September 2, 2021. Available at [https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-](https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/civil-liberties-and-vaccine-mandates-heres-our-take)  
1154 [liberties/civil-liberties-and-vaccine-mandates-heres-our-take](#). Accessed on August 24, 2022.
- 1155 124. OHRC Policy statement on COVID-19 vaccine mandates and proof of vaccine certificates.  
1156 Ontario Human Rights Commission. September 22, 2021. Available at [OHRC Policy statement](#)  
1157 [on COVID-19 vaccine mandates and proof of vaccine certificates | Ontario Human Rights](#)  
1158 [Commission](#) Accessed on August 30, 2022.
- 1159 125. Fraiman J, Erviti J, Jones M, Greenland S, Whelan P, Kaplan RM, Doshi P. Serious adverse  
1160 events of special interest following mRNA COVID-19 vaccination in randomized trials in  
1161 adults. *Vaccine* 2022 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.08.036>.